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1958] "CoNGREss SHALL MAKE No LAw ... " 
"CONGRESS SHALL MAKE NO LAW ... ":II* 
0. John Rogget 
Federal Police Power 
579 
THE framers of the federal bill of rights by the First and Tenth Amendments sought to deny Congress power over utterances 
unless they were connected with criminal conduct other than 
advocacy. Any power over such utterances was to reside in the 
states. However, the Supreme Court departed from the framers' 
intent. 
One of the factors in this development was the emergence of 
an undefined federal police power. This occurred largely under 
the commerce and postal clauses.1111 It began over a century ago. 
As early as 1838 Congress passed a law requiring the installation 
of safety devices upon steam vessels.1112 Beginning in 1842 Congress 
enacted a long series of statutes proscribing obscene material.11111 
The first such act prohibited the importation of "indecent and 
obscene prints, paintings, lithographs, engravings, and trans-
parencies."1114 In 1848 Congress prohibited the importation of 
spurious and adulterated drugs and provided a system of inspec-
tiqn to make the prohibition effective.1115 In 1865 Congress made 
it a misdemeanor to mail an "obscene book, pamphlet, picture, 
print, or other publication of a vulgar and indecent character."1116 
The next year Congress controlled the transportation on land 
and water of explosives.1117 In 1868 Congress made it unlawful to 
use the mails for lottery literature and paraphernalia.158 
•The first instalment of :this article was published in the January issue, 56 MicH. 
L. REv. 331 (1958).-Ed. 
tMember, New York Bar.-Ed. 
151Art. I. §8, els. 3 and 7. On the point generally, see ROGERS, THE PosrAL POWER 
OF CONGRESS (1916); Cushman, "National Police Power Under the Postal Clause of the 
Constitution," 4 MINN. L. REv. 402 (1920); Cushman, "The National Police Power Under 
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution," 3 MINN. L. REv. 289, 381, 452 (1919); Rogers, 
"The Extension of Federal Control Through the Regulation of the Mails," 27 HAR.v. L. 
R.Ev. 27 (1913). 
1112 Act of July 7, 1838, c. 191, 5 Stat. 304. 
1113 The Court in its opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 485 (1957), 
listed 20 such acts. 
1114 Act of Aug. 30, 1842, c. 270, §28, 5 Stat. 566. 
155 Act of June 26, 1848, c. 70, 9 Stat. 237. 
156Act of March 3, 1865, c. 89, §16, 13 Stat. 507. 
157 Act of July 3, 1866, c. 162, 14 Stat. 81. 
158 Act of July 27, 1868, c. 246, §_13, 15 Stat. 196. 
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In 1872 Congress codified the various postal laws, and added 
to its proscription of obscene material "disloyal devices printed 
or engraved."159 In the succeeding section it forbade "letters or 
circulars concerning illegal lotteries" and prohibited in addition 
those "concerning schemes devised and intended to deceive and 
defraud the public for the purpose of obtaining money under 
false pretences."160 The next year material relating to contracep-
tion was added- to the proscribed list.161 However, this same act 
eliminated the phrase about disloyal devices.162 In 1876 the 
provisions against lottery literature were broadened by eliminat-
ing the word "illegal."163 In 1895 Congress prohibited the intro-
duction or carriage of lottery tickets in the mails or in interstate 
commerce.164 This act was held constitutional in the Lottery Case, 
Champion v. Ames.165 Earlier measures against lotteries were 
sustained in Ex parte ]ackson166 and In re Rapier.161 In the 
Jackson case the Court announced that under the postal clause 
Congress could refuse the facilities of the mails "for the distribu-
tion of matter deemed injurious to the public morals."168 In 
Public Clearing House v. Coyne169 the Court upheld the post-
master general in the issuance of a fraud order authorizing the 
interception and return to the sender of all mail addressed to 
a company engaged in operating an endless chain scheme. The 
Court stated that Congress could "forbid the delivery of letters 
to such persons or corporations as in its judgment are making 
use of the mails for the purpose of fraud or deception or the dis-
semination among its citizens of information of a character cal-
culated to debauch the public morality."110 
In 1893 Congress began to enact the safety appliance acts 
now applicable to interstate railroads. The first of these was the 
Automatic Coupler Act.171 In 1906 Congress forbade the distri-
bution or sale of impure foods and drugs by means of interstate 
159 Act of June 8, 1872, c. 335, §148, 17 Stat. 302. 
160 Id., §149. 
161Act of March 3, 1873, c. 258, §1, 17 Stat. 598. 
162 Id., §2, 17 Stat. 599. 
163 Act of July 12, 1876, c. 186, §2, 19 Stat. 90. 
164Act of 'March 2, 1895, c. 191, 28 Stat. 963. 
165 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
166 96 U.S. 727 (1878). 
167 143 U.S. 110 (1892). 
168 96 U.S. 727 at 736 (1878). 
169 194 U.S. 497 (1904). 
110 Id. at 507-508. 
171 27 Stat. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C. (1952) §§1 to 8. 
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commerce: it passed two comprehensive statutes known as the 
Meat Inspection Act172 and the Pure Food Act.173 Two years 
later Congress passed legislation regulating the employment of 
children in the District of Columbia,174 and in 1916 prohibited 
the movement in interstate commerce of the products of child 
labor.175 In 1918 Congress enacted minimum wage legislation 
for women and children in the District of Columbia.176 This act 
was held unconstitutional in Adkins v. Children's Hospital;111 
but the Adkins case was subsequently overruled in West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish,118 involving a minimum wage statute of 
the state of Washington. 
In 1910 Congress enacted the Mann Act,179 which bore the 
title "An Act To further regulate interstate and foreign com-
merce by prohibiting the transportation therein for immoral 
purposes of women and girls, and for other purposes." This act 
was sustained in Hoke v. United States,180 and pushed to disturb-
ing lengths in Caminetti v. United States.181 
By an act of 1912 Congress made it an offense to import from 
abroad or transport in interstate commerce or send through the 
mails, for exhibition purposes, prize fight films.182 In the same 
year Congress provided that advertisements in second class mail 
had to be labelled as such.183 In 1919 Congress passed the National 
Motor Vehicle Theft Act.184 In the last year of the Hoover ad-
ministration it legislated against labor injunctions and "yellow 
dog" contracts,185 as well as against kidnaping.186 The former 
172Act of June 30, 1906, c. 3913, 34 Stat. 669, 674. 
173 Act of June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768. 
174 Act of May 28, 1908, c. 209, 35 Stat. 4-20. 
175 Act of Sept. 1, 1916, c. 432, 39 Stat. 675. 
176Act of Sept. 19, 1918, c. 174, 40 Stat. 960. 
177 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
178 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
179 36 Stat. 825 (1910), as amended, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §§24-21 to 2424. 
180 227 U.S. 308 (1913). 
181242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
182 Act of July 31, 1912, c. 263, 37 Stat. 240. 
183 37 Stat. 554 (1912), as amended, 39 U.S.C. (1952) §234. This provision was sustained· 
in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913). 
184 41 Stat. 324 (1919), as amended, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §§2311 to 2314. For a case at 
the 1956 term of the Court under :this act, see United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 
- (1957). The Court (at 417) gave the word "stolen" in this act a uniform meaning, and 
held that it "includes all felonious takings of motor vehicles with intent to deprive the 
owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or not the theft 
constitutes common-law larceny." 
185 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§101 to 107. 
18847 Stat. 326 (1932), as amended, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §1201. 
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is popularly known as the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the latter 
as the Lindbergh Act. 
Then came the New Deal, and with it many new statutes 
which greatly expanded the exercise of federal power. These 
included the Securities Act of 1933,187 the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934,188 the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,1811 
and the National Labor Relations Act, 190 enacted in the same 
year. There was federal legislation on such diverse subjects as 
cosmetics101 and racketeering.192 One act made it an offense to 
transport dentures if the impression for them was taken by one 
who was not licensed to practice dentistry.1118 The constitution-
ality of most of the securities legislation was settled in Electric 
Bond & Share Co. v. SEC,m and North American Co. v. SEC;195 
and that of the main provisions of the National Labor Relations 
Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.196 
More recently the Congress sought to restrain gambling by 
placing an occupational tax on gamblers.1117 This tax was sus-
tained in two Supreme Court decisions.1118 . 
Thus the federal government has expanded into a little bit 
of almost everything, from obscenity to prostitution, from cos-
metics to contraception, from labor relations to securities, from 
theft and fraud to food and drugs, from safety appliances to 
lotteries, racketeering and gambling. 
By way of contrast federal legislation when our Constitution 
was new placed much greater reliance on state governments. 
An act of 1799 directed federal coastal officials duly to observe 
"the quarantines and other restraints, which shall be required 
and established by the health laws of any state" with respect to 
any incoming vessels and "faithfully to aid in the execution of 
such quarantines and health laws."199 An act of 1803 told cus-
187 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§77a to 77aa. 
188 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§78a to 780, 78o-3, 78p to 78hh. 
189 49 Stat. 803, 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§79 to 79z-6. 
190 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§151 to 166. 
19152 Stat. 1054 (1938), 21 U.S.C. (1952) §§361 to 364 (part of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act). 
192 48 Stat. 979 (1934), as amended, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §1951. 
193 56 Stat. 1087 (1942), as amended, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §1821. 
194 303 U.S. 419 (1938). 
195 327 U.S. 686 (1946). 
196 301 U.S. I (1937). 
197 65 Stat. 529 (1951), as amended, 26 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §§4411 to 4413. 
198 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (as to persons in the states); Lewis 
v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955) (as to persons in the District of Columbia). 
199 Act of Feb. 25, 1799, c. 12, §1, 1 Stat. 619. 
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toms officers "to notice and be governed by the provisions of 
the laws now existing of the several states prohibiting the ad-
mission or importation of any negro, mulatto, or other person of 
colour."200 The Special Committee which reported adversely on 
President Jackson's proposal for barring the use of the mails to 
"incendiary publications" cited these acts to show the respect 
which Congress had been wont to give to state laws.201 
The federal government also branched out into sedition 
again, as well as into subversion generally. During World War I 
Congress enacted the country's second major sedition act; and 
with the struggle against international communism and Russian 
nationalism, a third, the Smith Act, as well as a volume of legis-
lation against subversion. The second sedition act was passed in 
1918 as an amendment of the Espionage Act of 1917; and the 
latter act in turn added new offenses to those established during 
the Civil War. 
During the Civil War Congress passed an act making it a 
crime for two or more persons in any state or territory to "con-
spire together to overthrow, or to put down, or to destroy by 
force, the Government of the United States."202 A derivative of 
this act is still on the statute books.203 There was also a general 
federal conspiracy statute, which became section 37 of the Crim-
inal Code of 1909.204 In addition, section 332 of this code included 
in its definition of a principal anyone who counselled or induced 
another to commit an offense against the United States.2011 It 
was under a combination of the latter two provisions that Emma 
Goldman and Alexander Berkman were convicted during World 
War I for conspiring by means of speeches and publications to 
induce men to evade the draft.2011 
It was not an offense, however, to persuade a man not to 
enlist voluntarily. Nor was it a crime if a lone individual made 
a deliberate but unsuccessful attempt to obstruct the draft, un-
less there were additional facts which made his conduct amount 
to treason. In the Espionage Act of 19 I 7 Congress accordingly 
made it a crime willfully to "cause or attempt to cause insub-
200 Act of Feb. 28, 1803, c. 10, §3, 2 Stat. 206. 
201 S. Rep. ll8, 24th Cong., 1st sess., 6 (1836); 49 NILE'S WEEKLY REGISTER. 408 at 410 
(1836). 
202 Act of July 31, 1861, c. 33, 12 Stat. 284. 
208 62 Stat. 808 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §2384. 
204 35 Stat. 1088, 1096 (1909). It is now 62 Stat. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. (1952) §371. 
205 35 Stat. 1088, ll52 (1909). 
206 Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918). 
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ordination" among members of our armed forces or willfully to 
"obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United 
States."207 These provisions were involved in the Schenck,208 
Frohwerk209 and Debs210 cases. 
The 1918 amendment inserted "attempt to obstruct" in the 
clause just quoted, and further proscribed various kinds of utter-
ances. For instance, it was an offense, when the United States was 
at war, willfully to "utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, 
profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of govern-
ment of the United States, or the Constitution· of the United 
States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or 
the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy 
of the United States, or any language intended to bring the form 
of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the 
United States, or the military or naval forces of the United 
States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the 
Army or Navy of the United States into contempt, scorn, con-
tumely, or disrepute."211 The A brams212 case arose under the 
provisions of this act. It was repealed on March 3, 1921.213 
The Espionage Act of 1917 also declared publications and 
other matter in violation of its provisions to be non-mailable.214 
The 1918 amendment added a section which empowered the post-
master general "upon evidence satisfactory to him that any per-
son or concern" was using the mails in violation of the act to 
cause mail addressed to any such person or concern to be re-
turned to the senders.215 
In 1940 came the Smith Act. Then under the impact of the 
cold war, which followed close on the heels of World War II, 
Congress passed numerous measures against subversion. These 
-included the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947,216 com-
monly known as the Taft-Hartley Act after Senator Robert A. 
201 Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, tit. I, §3, 40 Stat. 219. 
l!OS Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
209 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
210 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
211 Act of May 16, 1918, c. 75, §3, 40 Stat. 553. 
l!12 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
213 C. 136, 41 Stat. 1359. 
214 Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, tit. XII, §§1, 2, 40 Stat. 230. These provisions were 
involved in Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921), and Masses Pub. Co. 
v. Patten, (2d Cir. 1917) 246 F. 24, reversing (S.DN.Y. 1917) 244 F. 535. 
215 Act of May 16, 1918, c. 75, §4, 40 Stat. 554. , 
216Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 29, 
50 App., U.S.C.). 
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Taft of Ohio and Representative Fred A. Hartley, Jr., of New 
Jersey, the Internal Security Act of 1950,217 known as well as 
the McCarran Act, after Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada, and 
the Communist Control Act of 1954.218 The Taft-Hartley Act in 
section 9(h) requires the officers of any labor union wishing to 
use the machinery of the National Labor Relations Board to 
file with the Board non-communist aflidavits.2111 Title I of the 
Internal Security Act of 1950 is officially designated as the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act of 1950. This title requires "Com-
munist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations to register 
with the attorney general. The Communist Control Act of 1954 
provides that membership in the Communist Party, with knowl-
edge of the party's purpose, subjects one "to all the provisions 
and penalties of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended, 
as a member of a 'Communist-action' organization."219a Just what 
this means is a matter of doubt. As a result of this measure there 
is now legislation aimed at three types of communist organiza-
tions: communist action, communist front, and communist in-
filtrated. A labor union which is determined to be any of these 
three types is ineligible to act as an employees' bargaining repre-
sentative under the National Labor Relations Act. When Presi-
dent Eisenhower signed this measure he issued a statement in 
which he said: ". . . I am proud that in this battle against the 
subversive elements in this country we have been able to pre-
serve the rights of the accused in accordance with our traditions 
and the Bill of Rights."220 
The Supreme Court sustained the validity of section 9(h) 
of the Taft-Hartley Act in American Communications Assn. v. 
Douds,221 and of the advocacy provisions of the Smith Act in 
Dennis v. United States.222 The constitutionality of the Sub-
217 Act of Sept. 23, 1950, c. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 
18, 22, 50 U.S.C.). 
218 68 Stat. 775, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §§841 to 844, 782, 784(a)(l)(E), 789, 790, 
79l(e)(3), 792a, 793(a)(b). 
219 61 Stat. 143, 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159(h). 
219aAct of Aug. 24, 1954, c. 886, 68 Stat. 775 at 776. 
220 N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1954, p. 1:4. In 1956 Congress passed yet more legislation 
against subversion. 70 Stat. 899, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §§851 to 857 (requiring registra-
tion of persons trained in espionage activities by any foreign government or political 
party); 70 Stat. 623, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §§2384, 2385 (increasing penalties for 
seditious conspiracy from $5000 and six years to $20,000 and twenty years; and for ad-
vocating violent overthrow of the government from $10,000 and ten years to $20,000 and 
twenty years). 
221339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
222 341 U.S. 494 (1951), affirming (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 201. 
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versive Activities Control Act of 1950 was argued before it in 
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,223 but 
the Court did not reach the issue. Instead it sent the case back 
to the Subversive Activities Control Board for reconsideration 
because of the alleged false testimony of three government wit-
nesses: Harvey Matusow, Paul Crouch, and Manning Johnson. 
Intent, Attempt, Solicitation and Conspiracy 
Another factor which helped to prepare the way for the 
Supreme Court's affirmation of the constitutionality of the ad-
vocacy provisions of the Smith Act in the Dennis case was Jus-
tice Holmes' extension in his "clear and present danger" test 
of the approach in the law of attempts and of conspiracy to the 
field of speech.224 This was what Chief Justice Vinson in the 
Dennis case described as Justice Holmes' "classic dictum"225 in 
the Schenck226 case. By his test Justice Holmes made an exception 
to the First Amendment for words which "are used in such cir-
cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and pres-
ent danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress had the right to prevent."227 This test has been com-
mended, as one "of great value,"228 by Professor Chafee, and con-
demned as "both unintelligible in practice and baseless in 
theory,"229 by Alexander Meiklejohn. A little earlier Meiklejohn 
described it "as a peculiarly inept and unsuccessful attempt to 
formulate an exception to the principle of freedom of speech."280 
Recently Judge Learned Hand, who in the Dennis case turned 
Justice Holmes' test into its converse,230• questioned its survival. 
223 351 U.S. 115 (1956), reversing (D.C. Cir. 1954) 223 F. (2d) 531. 
224 Judge Herbert F. Goodrich of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, while he was a law teacher, wrote that Justice Holmes' "test is similar to the 
common law liability for attempt to commit a crime-the act done by the wrongdoer 
must have come dangerously near to success." ''Does the Constitution Protect Free 
Speech?" 19 MICH. L. REv. 487 at 492 (1921), and 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITtmONAL 
LAw 1068, 1072 (1938). Judge Hastie in his dissenting opinion, in which Judge Maris 
joined, in United States v. 'Mesarosh, (3d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 449, reversed 352 U.S. 
1 (1956), quoted this statement (at 461) with approval. Judge Goodrich in that case 
voted with the majority. 
225 341 U.S. 494 at 503 (1951). 
22a 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
227Id. at 52 
228 FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 81 (1948). 
229 "The First Amendment and Evils That Congress Has a Right To Prevent," 26 
!ND. L.J. 477 (1951). 
2so FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION To SELF-GOVERNMENT 50 (1948). 
280a (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 201 at 212. 
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In the last of his three Holmes Lectures at the Harvard Law 
School he is reported to have said: "I doubt that the doctrine 
will persist, and I cannot help thinking that for once Homer 
nodded. "23ob 
The law of attempts, although now largely governed by 
statute, began as an exercise by courts of a common law power 
to punish dangerous conduct not proscribed by statute.231 One 
can find early instances of the exercise of this power,232 but the law 
of attempts received its formulation and development under the 
guiding ha~d of Lord Mansfield. A leading case is Rex v. 
Scofield.233 There the defendant was charged with having put 
a lighted candle among matches and small pieces of wood under 
the stairway of a house with the intent to burn the house. But 
there was neither allegation nor proof that the house was burned. 
The defendant's counsel argued that an attempt to commit a 
misdemeanor234 was not an indictable offense. Lord Mansfield 
and Justice Bullard answered: "It makes a great difference, wheth-
er an act was done; as in this case putting fire to a candle in the 
midst of combustible matter, (which was the only act necessary 
to commit a mesdemeanor) and where no act at all is done. The 
intent may make an act, innocent in itself, criminal; nor is the 
completion of an act, criminal in itself, necessary to constitute 
criminality. Is it no offence to set fire to a train of gunpowder 
with intent to burn a house, because by accident, or the inter-
position of another the mischief is prevented?"235 
It was the law of attempts which Justice Holmes discussed 
as a judge of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 
230b N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1958, p. 12:1. 
231 See Arnold, "Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction," 40 YALE 
L. J. 53 (1930). 
Of course, as Justice Douglas put it for the Court in Jerome v. United States, 
318 U.S. 101 at 104 (1943), ". . . there is no common law offense against the 
United States ..•. " See also United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); United States 
v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 31 (1812). Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 at 168 
(1952); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 at 412-413 (1945) (concurring opinion of 
Justice Frankfurter); Marcello v. United States, (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 437 at 443. 
Hence an attempt to commit a federal crime would not itself be criminal federally unless 
a federal statute made it so. In re Guayde, (C.C,N.Y. 1901) 112 F. 415 (attempt to import 
women into the United States for the purposes of prostitution). But see United States 
v. Galleanni, (D.C. Mass. 1917) 245 F. 977 at 978-979. 
232 See Sayre, "Criminal Attempts," 41 HARv. L. REv. 821 at 826-834 (1928). 
233 Cald. Magis. Cases 397 (1784). 
234 Id. at 399. The defendant was in possession of the house, and thus it was not a 
felony at common law for :him to burn it. 
235 Id. at 400. 
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Commonwealth v. Kennedy,286 and as chief justice of that court 
in Commonwealth v. Peaslee,287 before going to the federal Su-
preme Court. The Kennedy case involved an attempt to kill by 
placing poison in the victim's cup. In sustaining a conviction 
Justice Holmes writing for the court said: 
". . . As the aim of the law is not to punish sins, but is 
to prevent certain external results, the act done must come 
pretty near to accomplishing that result before the law will 
notice it. . . . Every question of proximity must be deter-
mined by its own circumstances, and analogy is too imper-
fect to give much help. Any unlawful application of poison 
is an evil which threatens death, according to common appre-
hension, and the gravity of the crime, the uncertainty of the 
result, and the seriousness of the apprehension, coupled 
with the great harm likely to result from poison even if not 
enough to kill, would warrant holding the liability for an 
attempt to begin at a point more remote from the possibility 
of accomplishing what is expected and might be the case with 
1. h · "28s 1g ter crimes. . . . 
In the Peaslee case the indictment charged simply that the 
defendant had put combustible material in a building with in-
tent to burn it. The court held the indictment insufficient. In 
the course of the court's opinion Chief Justice Holmes pointed 
out that in order to constitute an indictable attempt, more than 
preparation was necessary. The difference between them, how-
ever, was only one of degree. He said: 
". . . [P]reparation is not an attempt. But some prepara-
tions may amount to an attempt. It is a question of degree. 
If the preparation comes very near to the accomplishment of 
the act, the intent to complete it renders the crime so prob-
able that the act will be a misdemeanor although there is 
still a locus penitentiae in the need of a further execution 
of the will to complete the crime. As was observed in a re-
cent case, the degree of proximity held sufficient may vary 
with circumstances, including among other things the appre-
hension which the particular crime is calculated to ex-
cite .... "280 
A recent illustrative federal case is United States v. Coplon.240 
286170 Mass. 18, 48 N.E. 770 (1897). 
287 177 -Mass. 267, 59 N.E. 55 (1901). · 
288 170 Mass. 18 at 20, 22, 48 N.E. at 770 (1897). 
289 177 Mass. 267 at 272, 59 N:E. 55 (1901). 
240 (2d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 629, cert. den. 342 U.S. 920 (1952). 
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Judith Coplon was convicted of an attempt to deliver defense 
information to a Russian confederate, Gubitchev. She had the 
material in her purse but before she could hand it over to him 
they were arrested. The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, although reversing the conviction, nevertheless held that 
the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt. Chief Judge 
Learned Hand wrote for the court: "There can be no doubt in 
the case at bar that 'preparation' had become 'attempt.' "241 
Justice ,Holmes also dealt with the law of attempts in his 
The Common Law: 
"Some acts may be attempts or misdemeanors which 
could not have effected the crime unless followed by 
other acts on the part of the ,vrong-doer. For instance, light-
ing a match with intent to set fire to a haystack has been 
held to amount to a criminal attempt to burn it, although 
the defendant blew out the match on seeing that he was 
watched. So the purchase of dies for making counterfeit coin 
is a misdemeanor, although of course the coin would not be 
counterfeited unless the dies were used. . . . 
"It will be readily seen that there are limits to this 
kind of liability. The law does not punish every act which 
is done with the intent to bring about a crime. If a man starts 
from Boston to Cambridge for the purpose of committing 
a murder when he gets there, but is stopped by the draw and 
goes home, he is no more punishable than if he had sat in 
his chair and resolved to shoot somebody, but on second 
thoughts had given up the notion. . . . We have seen what 
amounts to an attempt to burn a haystack; but it was said in 
the same case, that, if the defendant had gone no further 
241 Id. at 633. For other federal cases holding that the conduct in question amounted 
to a criminal attempt, see Lemke v. United States, (9th Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 73, cert. den. 
347 U.S. 1013 (1954) (attempt to obtain money under !alse pretellses); Daniel v. United 
States, (8th Cir. 1942) 127 F. (2d) I (attempt to transport liquor into Kansas, a dry state); 
Gregg v. United States, (8th Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 687, reversed on other grounds on 
rehearing, (8th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 609 (same); United States v. Baker, (S.D. Cal. 1955) 
129 F. Supp. 684 (attempt to rob a bank); United States v. Duane, (D.C. Neb. 1946) 
66 F. Supp. 459 (attempt to transport liquor into Kansas). 
For federal cases holding conduct to amount to preparation falling short of an 
attempt, see Seiden v. United States, (2d Cir. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 197 (manufacture of spirits 
did not constitute attempt to defraud United States of taxes on liquor while engaged 
as a distiller); Wooldridge v. United States, (9th Cir. 1916) 237 F. 775 (arranging with 
a girl under 16 years of age to meet her at a particular place and meeting her at the 
appointed place held not to be an _attempt to commit rape); United States v. Stephens, 
(C.C. Ore. 1882) 12 F. 52 (transmitting from Alaska to a firm in San Francisco a letter 
ordering whiskey to •be sent to Alaska held not to amount to an attempt to introduce 
spirituous liquors into Alaska). 
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than to buy a box of matches for the purpose, he would not 
have been liable. 
"Eminent judges have been puzzled where to draw the 
line, or even to state the principle on which it should be 
drawn, between the two sets of cases. But the principle is 
believed to be similar to that on which all other lines are 
drawn by the law. Public policy, that is to say, legislative 
considerations, are at the bottom of the matter; the consid-
erations being, in this case, the nearness of the danger, the 
greatness of the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt. 
When a man buys matches to fire a haystack, or starts on a 
journey meaning to murder at the end of it, there is still 
a considerable chance that he will change his mind before 
he comes to the point. But when he has struck the match, 
or cocked and aimed the pistol, there is very little chance that 
he will not persist to the end, and the danger becomes so 
great that the law steps in. With an object which could not 
be used innocently, the point of intervention might be put 
fu7t~er back, as in the case of the purchase of a die for 
commg. 
"The degree of apprehension may affect the decision, as 
well as the degree of probability that the crime will be ac-
complished. . . . "242 
In judging whether conduct is sufficiently dangerous to con-
stitute a criminal attempt, intent, as Lord Mansfield and Justice 
Holmes made plain, is a relevant factor. In Swift & Go. v. United 
States,243 a Sherman Anti-Trust Act case, Justice Holmes as a 
member of the United States Supreme Court in writing the 
Court's opinion further explained: 
". . . The statute gives this proceeding against combinations 
in restraint of commerce among the States and against at-
tempts to monopolize the same. Intent is almost essential 
to such a combination and is essential to such an attempt. 
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a 
result which the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the mon-
opoly-but require further acts in addition to the mere forces 
of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it 
to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous prob-
ability that it will happen. Commonwealth v. Peaslee .... 
But when that intent and the consequent dangerous prob-
242 HOLMES, THE COMMON !.AW 66-69 (1881). 
243 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
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ability exist, this statute, like many others and like the com-
mon law in some cases, directs itself against that dangerous 
probability as well as against the completed result .... "244 
Years earlier in The Common Law he wrote: 
"There is another class of cases in which intent plays 
an important part, for quite different reasons from those 
which have been offered to account for the laws of malicious 
mischief. The most obvious example of this class are crim-
inal attempts. Attempt and intent, of course, are two dis-
tinct things. Intent to commit a crime is not itself criminal. 
There is no law against a man's intending to commit a mur-
der the day after tomorrow. The law only deals with con-
duct. An attempt is an overt act. . . . 
". . . The importance of the intent is not to show that 
the act was wicked, but to show that it was likely to be fol-
lowed by hurtful consequence."245 
For example, the conduct of one who on a hunting trip shoots 
at a bear and accidentally hits a companion is less dangerous than 
that of one who with intent to kill shoots at a person and misses; 
for on an overall basis the conduct of those who act with an intent 
to kill another will result in many more homicides than the con-
duct of those who have no such intent. 
The crime of solicitation rests on the same basis and began in 
the same way as that of attempt. A little over a decade and a half 
after the Scofield case came Rex v. Higgins.246 There the defend-
ant was indicted for soliciting the servant of another to steal his 
master's goods but the indictment contained no charge that the 
servant either agreed to, or did, steal the goods. The Court of 
King's Bench, relying heavily upon the Scofield case, affirmed a 
judgment of conviction. Justice Lawrence in the course of his 
opinion said: 
" ... [A]ll offences of a public nature, that is, all such acts 
or attempts as tend to the prejudice of the community, are 
indictable. Then the question is, whether an attempt to get 
another to steal is not prejudicial to the community? of which 
there can be no doubt. The whole argument for the defend-
ant turns upon a fallacy in assuming that no act is charged 
to have been done by him; for a solicitation is an act .... "247 
244 Id. at 396. 
245 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 65, 68 (1881). 
246 2 East 5, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (1801). 
247 Id. at 21, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 at 275 (1801). 
592 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 56 
As in the law of attempts, again there was a case before the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts while Justice Holmes 
was a member of that court, Commonwealth v. Flagg.248 The 
indictment charged that the defendant offered ten dollars to an-
other to burn a certain barn. This was held sufficient. Chief 
Justice Morton wrote for the court: "It is an indictable of-
fence at common law for one to counsel and solicit another to 
commit a felony or other aggravated offence, although the solici-
tation is of no effect, and the crime counselled is not in fact 
committed. . . . "249 
Legal writers and courts have differed as to whether a solici-
tation should be treated as a distinct crime from an attempt. 
Professor Francis B. Sayre wrote: 
". . . Although in some jurisdictions solicitations are treated 
as indictable attempts, either by virtue of judicial decisions 
failing to distinguish them, or by statutory provisions, the 
great weight of authority is otherwise. Analytically the two 
crimes are distinct. Each has its mm peculiar features; clearly 
not every indictable solicitation can be considered as an in-
dictable attempt. The one who attempts to commit a felony 
becomes a principal if the attempt succeeds, and he who solic-
its becomes an accessory before the fact. An indictable solic-
itation may not come close enough to the crime to constitute 
an indictable attempt. For ins~ance, where A urges B to mur-
der C in another town, and B is persuaded to do so but, be-
cause of A's conversation having been overheard, is arrested 
when entering a store to purchase a revolver, B's acts have 
not gone beyond the stage of mere preparation, and neither 
A nor B should be convicted for an attempt. A should, never-
theless, be liable for the crime of solicitation, and both A 
and B for the crime of conspiracy. In spite of their many 
similarities, therefore, these two crimes should not be con-
fused. "200 
On the other hand Thurman W. Arnold argued: 
"Solicitation involves the same considerations as attempts. 
The conduct simply consists of hiring or inducing someone 
to act instead of acting oneself. Courts should assume the 
same kind of power to extend the limits of a given rule to 
cover persuasion and inducements, as well as conduct, where 
the policy of the particular rule seems to require it. There 
248 135 Mass. 545 (1883). 
249 Id. at 549. 
250 Sayre, "Criminal Attempts,'' 41 HARv. L. REv. 821 at 857-858 (1928). 
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is no object in treating it differently from attempt. The dis-
tinction between solicitation and attempt leads to an occa-
sional absurd result, but usually it is a harmless device for 
relieving a defendant of liability under an attempt indict-
ment when his conduct seems not sufficiently serious to merit 
court action. "251 
So far as treating a solicitation as an attempt is concerned, it 
would seem that Arnold has the better of the argument. In the 
suppositious case which Professor Sayre puts there is no reason 
why A, if deemed to be guilty of an offense in addition to that of 
conspiracy, should not be held liable for the crime of attempt. 
However, if A solicits B to commit an offense and B refuses, 
A should no more be held guilty of an attempt than if he had 
gone to a store to buy a revolver in order to murder somebody 
or a box of matches in order to burn a building and the store-
keeper refused to sell to him.252 A fortiori should this result apply 
to the general advocacy of illegal action. Francis Wharton wisely 
reasoned in his Criminal Law: 
"For we would be forced to admit, if we hold that solicita-
tions to criminality are generally indictable, that the propa-
gandists, even in conversation, of agrarian or communistic 
theories are liable to criminal prosecutions; and hence the 
necessary freedom of speech and of the press would be great-
ly infringed. It would be hard, also, we must agree, if we 
maintain such general responsibility, to defend, in prosecu-
tions for soliciting crime, the publishers of Byron's "Don 
Juan," of Rousseau's "Emile," or of Goethe's "Elective Af-
finities." Lord Chesterfield in his letters to his son, directly 
advises the latter to form illicit connections with married 
women; Lord Chesterfield, on the reasoning here contested, 
would be indictable for solicitation to adultery. Undoubt-
edly, when such solicitations are so publicly and indecently 
made as to produce public scandal, they are indictable as 
nuisances or as libels. But to make bare solicitations or allure-
ments _indictable as attempts, not only unduly and peril-
ously extends the scope of penal adjudication, but forces 
on the courts psychological questions which they are incom-
petent to decide, and a branch of business which would make 
them despots of every intellect in the land. "253 
251Arnold, "Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction," 40 YALE 
L. J. 53 at 76-77 (1930). 
252 See United States v. Stephens, (C.C. Ore. 1882) 12 F. 52. 
253 Vol. 1, §218 (12th ed. Ruppenthal 1932). 
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From the standpoint of arresting probably dangerous con-
duct the crime of conspiracy involves the same considerations 
as that of attempt, but, unlike that of attempt, it did not begin 
as a general offense at common law. Rather it originated in a 
series of statutes dating from the time of Edward I enacted to 
remedy specific abuses: at first only combinations to procure 
false indictments, bring false appeals, or maintain vexatious suits 
constituted criminal conspiracies.254 
Whereas the crime of solicitation should be treated as part 
of that of attempt the crime of conspiracy should not be so treat-
ed; for the very fact that persons have entered into a conspiracy 
to do a certain act increases the chances that the act will be done. 
As Chief Justice Vinson wrote in the Dennis case, "It is the exist-
ence of the conspiracy which creates the danger."255 Thus the 
crime consists in the conspiracy. As Judge Justin Miller stated 
in his Handbook of Criminal Law, "The reason for finding crim-
inal liability in case of a combination to effect an unlawful end 
or to use unlawful means, where none would exist, even though 
the act contemplated were actually committed by an individual, 
is that a combination of persons to commit a wrong, either as 
an end or as a means to an end, is so much more dangerous, be-
cause of its increased power to do wrong, because it is more diffi-
cult to guard against and prevent the evil designs of a group of 
persons than of a single person, and because of the terror which 
fear of such a combination tends to create in the minds of 
people."256 
An overt act might or might not be required. It was not at 
common law.257 The general federal conspiracy statute,258 first 
enacted in 1867,259 calls for an overt act; but the act making it a 
crime to conspire to overthrow the government of the United 
States by force,260 first enacted during the Civil War,261 and the 
254 See Sayre, "Criminal -Conspiracy," 35 HAR.v. L. REv. 393 at 396 (1922). 
255 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 511 (1951), quoted with approval at the 
1956 •term in the Court's opinion in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 at 317 (1957). 
256,MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 110 (1934). Justice Jackson set forth this 
comment in his concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 573-574 
(1951). See also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 at 643-644 (1946); Frohwerk v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 204 at 210 (1919); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 at 477 
(1918); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 at 88 (1915). 
257 See Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S. 52 at 55 (1921); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 
373 at 378 (1913). 
258 62 Stat. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. (1952) §371. 
259 Act of 'March 2, 1867, c. 169, §30, 14 Stat. 484. 
260 62 Stat. 808 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §2384. 
261.Act of July 31, 1861, c; 33, 12 Stat. 284. 
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Sherman Anti-Trust Act262 do not. Neither did the Smith Act.263 
Even if an overt act is necessary, it need not be dangerous enough 
to constitute an attempt; indeed, in and of itself it need not be 
dangerous at all, for the danger lies in the act of conspiring. 
Justice Holmes pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Hyde v. 
United States:264 
" ... [A] conspiracy is not an attempt .... An attempt, in the 
strictest sense, is an act expected to bring about a substantive 
wrong by the forces of nature. With it is classed the kindred 
offence where the act and the natural conditions present or 
supposed to be present are not enough to do the harm with-
out a further act, but where it is so near to the result that 
if coupled with an intent to produce that result, the danger 
is very great. Swift & Co. v. United States. . . . But com-
bination, intention, and overt act may all be present with-
out amounting to a criminal attempt-as if all that were 
done should be an agreement to murder a man fifty miles 
away and the purchase of a pistol for the purpose. There 
must be dangerous proximity to success. But when that exists 
the overt act is the essence of the offence [of attempt]. On 
the other hand, the essence of the conspiracy is being com-
bined for an unlawful purpose; and if an overt act is re-
quired, it does not matter how remote the act may be from 
accomplishing the purpose, if done to effect it; that is, I 
suppose, in furtherance of it in any degree .... "265 
Or as Justice Harlan wrote at the last term in the Court's 
opinion in the Yates, Schneiderman and Richmond cases concern-
ing the overt act, "Nor, indeed, need such an act, taken by itself, 
even be criminal in character. Braverman v. United States, 317 
U.S. 49. The function of the overt act in a conspiracy prosecution 
is simply to manifest 'that the conspiracy is at work,' Carlson v. 
United States, 187 F. 2d 366, 370 .... "266 
262 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1 to 7. In sustaining this provision in Nash 
v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913), Justice Holmes (at 378) wrote for the Court: "Coming 
next to the objection that no overt act is laid, the answer is that the Sherman Act 
punishes the conspiracies at which it is aimed on the common law footing-that is to 
say, it does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition 
of liability." 
263 Act of June 28, 1940, c. 439, §3, 54 Stat. 671. With the revision of the criminal 
code in 1948 Smith Act conspiracy cases were brought under the general federal con-
. spiracy statute, 62 Stat. 701, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §371, and an overt act is now necessary. 
See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
264 225 U.S. 347 (1912). 
265 Id. at 387-388. 
266 354 U.S. 298 at 334. 
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If one applies the law of attempt and conspiracy, with the 
suggested approach of treating solicitation as an attempt, to the 
field of speech and of the press one should arrive at the conclusion 
that the exhortation or incitement of another to do an illegal act 
should not, without more, amount to a crime. The same result 
should follow if there is no more than the advocacy by an in-
dividual of the overthrow of the government by force and vio-
lence. The question becomes more difficult of resolution if there is 
a conspiracy to advocate such overthrow, for such conduct is more 
dangerous than the advocacy of violence by a lone individual. 
Thus Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in the Dennis267 
case placed his approval of the constitutionality of the advocacy 
provisions of the Smith Act on the strongest possible ground, 
that of conspiracy.268 Nevertheless, even a conspiracy to advocate 
the violent overthrow of the government should not be regarded 
as sufficiently dangerous to suffer proscription. Moreover to treat 
such conduct as criminal is not an effective remedy for it. To 
this point, too, Justice Jackson addressed himself in his concur-
ring opinion in the Dennis case. In his concluding paragraph he 
wrote: "While I think there was power in Congress to enact this 
statute and that, as applied in this case, it cannot be held uncon-
stitutional, I add that I have little faith in the long-range effect-
iveness of this conviction to stop the rise of the Communist move-
ment. Communism will not go to jail with these Communists. 
No decision by this Court can forestall revolution whenever tlie 
existing government fails to command the respect and loyalty of 
the people and sufficient distress and discontent is allowed to 
grow up among the masses. Many failures by fallen governments 
attest that no government can long prevent revolution by out-
lawry. . . . "269 • 
In any event a conspiracy to advocate violence as well as the 
individual advocacy of violence, without more, should be held 
to be within the protection of the First Amendment. However, 
the law started on another course. 
267 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
268 Id. at 572-577. 
269 Id. at 577-578. Ch~rles Holt, one of those imprisoned under the Sedition Act of 
1798, after he got out of prison, continued writing, but under the pseudonym, Nathan 
Sleek. This was one of the things he wrote: "Punishment only hardens printers .••• [T]hey 
come out of jail holding their heads higher than if they had never been persecuted. 
Finally they assume the appearance of innocent men who have suffered wrongfully." 
Quoted in SMITH, FREEDOlll:'S FEITERS 384 (1956). 
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"A Clear and Present Danger" 
The points of departure for that other course were Fox v. 
Washington210 and Goldman v. United States.211 The Fox case 
involved a statute of the state of Washington which made the 
advocacy of the commission of any crime an offense. The printed 
matter in question was an article entitled "The Nude and the 
Prudes." Apparently some nudists had been arrested and convict-
ed for indecent exposure. The article predicted and encouraged 
the boycott of those who had been responsible for this, and con-
cluded: "The boycott will be pushed until these invaders will 
come to see the brutal mistake of their action and so inform the 
people." The Supreme Court sustained a conviction under the 
state statute for these utterances. Justice Holmes delivered the 
Court's opinion. He took the article in question to advocate a 
breach of the state laws against indecent exposure. Without re-
ferring to Commonwealth v. Flagg212 he ·wrote concerning the 
Washington statute: " ... It lays hold of encouragements that, 
apart from statute, if directed to a particular person's conduct, 
generally would make him who uttered them guilty of a mis-
demeanor if not an accomplice or a principal in the crime en-
couraged, and deals with the publication of them to a wider and 
less selected audience. Laws of this description are not un-
familiar. . . . "273 
However, apart from the constitutional question whether 
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that 
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law" have a greater power over utterances 
than the federal government under the First Amendment's in-
junction that "Congress shall make no law,"274 it would seem 
clear that as a matter of good government the utterances in ques-
tion should not have been punished. 
In the Goldman case Emma Goldman and Alexander Berk-
man for their utterances were convicted of a conspiracy to in-
210 236 U.S. 273 (1915). 
271245 U.S. 474 (1918). 
272 135 Mass. 545 (1883). 
273 236 U.S. 273 at 277-278. 
274 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 498, 501, 503, 505-507 (1957) (concurring 
and dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 at 288, 
294-295 (1952) (dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 
at 672 (1925) (dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in which Justice Brandeis joined). 
Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
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duce resistance to the Selective Draft Law of 1917. The Supreme 
Court sustained their conviction. Chief Justice White wrote for 
the Court: " ... an unlawful conspiracy under §37 of the Crim-
inal Code to bring about an illegal act and the doing of overt 
acts in furtherance of such conspiracy is in and of itself inherently 
and substantially a crime punishable as such irrespective of wheth-
er the result of the conspiracy has been to accomplish its illegal 
end. United States v. Rabinowich ... and the authorities there 
cited."274a 
The stage was now set for the Schenck,215 Frohwerk216 and 
Debs211 cases, the first cases which the Court decided under the 
Espionage Act of 1917. Eugene V. Debs and the defendants in 
the Schenck case were socialists. The defendants in the Frohwerk 
case were German sympathizers who put out a German language 
newspaper, the Missouri Staats Zeitung. Debs was indicted under 
the 1917 act, as amended in 1918, for obstructing and attempt-
ing to obstruct the draft by making a speech in which he ad-
vocated socialism and advanced the Marxist thesis that capitalism 
caused wars. The defendants in the other two cases were indicted, 
among other things, for conspiring to obstruct the draft; in the 
Schenck case by circulating a socialist leaflet, and in the Frohwerk 
case by distributing a newspaper. In the Schenck case there was 
also evidence that the defendants mailed their leaflet to draftees. 
The Court unanimously affirmed judgments of conviction in all 
three cases. In each instance Justice Holmes delivered the Court's 
op1mon. 
It was in the Schenck case that he laid down his clear and 
present danger test: 
". . . The question in every case is whether the words are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. 
It is a question of proximity and degree .... The Statute of 
19 I 7, in §4 punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as actual 
obstruction. If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) 
its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the 
same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone 
274a 245 U.S. 474 at 477 (1918). 
275 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
276 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
277 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
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warrants making the act a crime. Goldman v. United 
States. . . ."278 
In the Frohwerk case he added: 
". . . We venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor 
Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, ever 
supposed that to make criminal the counselling of a murder 
within the jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitu-
tional interference with free speech. . . . 
"It is said that the first count is bad because it does not 
allege the means by which the conspiracy was to be carried out. 
But a conspiracy to obstruct recruiting would be criminal 
even if no means were agreed upon specifically by which to 
accomplish the intent. It is enough if the parties agreed to 
set to work for that common purpose. That purpose could be 
accomplished or aided by persuasion as well as by false state-
ments. . . . The conspiracy is the crime, and that is one, 
however diverse its objects .... "279 
However, it is submitted that in none of these cases, nor in 
the Fox and Goldman cases, was sufficient consideration given, 
from a legislative standpoint, to the lack of danger in the pro-
scribed conduct, and, from a judicial standpoint, in view of the 
First Amendment, to the lack, apart from speech, of criminal 
conduct. Neither legislatively nor judicially was there an ade-
quate distinction between the word and the criminal deed. In 
the Fox and Goldman cases the First Amendment was not dis-
278 249 U.S. 47 at 52 (1919). 
279 249 U.S. 204 at 206, 209-210 (1919). In Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 
(1920), Justice Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Holmes joined, quoted 
Justice Holmes' clear and present danger test in the Schenck case and explained (at 
482-483): "This is a rule of reason .... The question whether in a particular instance 
the words spoken or written fall within the permissible curtailment of free speech is, 
under the rule enunciated by this court, one of degree. . . . If the words were of such 
a nature and were used under such circumstances that men, judging in calmness, could 
not reasonably say that they created a clear and present danger that they would bring 
about the evil which Congress sought and had a right to prevent, then it is the duty of 
the trial judge to withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury; and if he fails 
to do so, it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error .... " In a concurring 
opinion for himself and Justice Holmes in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), 
he stated (at 376-377): " ••. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, 
between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne 
in mind. . . . [N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless 
the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there 
is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. • • ." 
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cussed at all.280 In the other three cases it was considered in too 
cursory a fashion. Justice Holmes bears out this observation in 
a comment he made about the Debs case in a letter to Sir Fred-
erick Pollock: ". . . There was a lot of jaw about free speech, 
which I dealt with somewhat summarily in an earlier case-
Schenck v. U.S . ... also Frohwerk v. U.S . ... As it happens I 
should go farther probably than the majority in favor of it, and 
I daresay it was partly on that account that the C.J. assigned the 
case to me."281 
Chief Justice Vinson was thus correct when in his opinion 
in the Dennis case he referred, in connection with the Schenck 
case, to "the summary treatment accorded an argument based 
upon an individual's claim that the First Amendment protected 
certain utterances."282 He was also right in his appraisal of what 
he called "the Holmes-Brandeis rationale," which became the 
Court's approach. After discussing Gitlow v. New York,283 he 
stated: "Justices Holmes and Brandeis, then, made no distinction 
between a federal statute which made certain acts unlawful, 
the evidence to support the conviction being speech, and a statute 
which made speech itself the crime. This approach was em-
phasized in Whitney v. People of State of California. . . ."284 
But Debs should not have gone to prison for making what 
Chief Justice Vinson described in the Dennis case as "one speech 
attacking United States' participation in the war";285 nor the 
defendants in the Frohwerk case for what Chief Justice Vinson 
in the same case called the "publication of twelve newspaper 
articles attacking the war."286 The Schenck case is somewhat 
more difficult of resolution, for the defendants mailed their leaf-
lets to draftees; but they, too, should have been permitted to go 
their way unmolested. 
A lone individual should be free to advocate anything, even 
a violation of the law. It is too difficult to draw a distinction be-
280 In the Schenck case Justice Holmes said with reference to the Goldman case: 
"Indeed .that case might be said to dispose of the present contention if the precedent 
covers all media concludendi. But as the right to free speech was not referred to specially, 
we have thought fit to add a few words." 249 U.S. 47 at 52. The Fox case, since it arose 
before Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), confined its discussion to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
2812 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, Howe ed., 7 (1941). 
282J)ennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 503 (1951). 
283 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
284 341 U.S. 357 at 506 (1927). 
285 Id. at 504. 
286Ibid. 
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tween advocacy of a change in the law and incitement to a viola-
tion of it. Besides, such advocacy is of little consequence in a 
sound society; its proscription, at least by Congress, violates the 
First Amendment; and its suppression is not an effective counter-
measure. A conspiracy to advocate a violation of the law may in-
volve more danger than such advocacy by an unattached in-
dividual, brit the same considerations apply and the same result 
should follow. 
One closer case remains, a conspiracy to cause a violation of 
the law, to be carried out by advocacy: this was the Schenck 
case. As Justice Holmes pointed out in the Frohwerk281 case, the 
conspiracy was the crime. However, again and especially at this 
juncture, a distinction should have been drawn between speech 
and other conduct. It should have made a determining differ-
ence in the Schenck case whether the conspiracy to obstruct the 
draft was to be carried out by advocacy, or by some physical 
means, such as, let us say, the abduction of a draftee. It is only 
in the latter instance that the conspiracy should have been punish-
able. 
It was in the Schenck case that Justice Holmes made his 
famous statement about shouting fire in a crowded theatre. What 
he actually said was: "The most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a 
theatre and causing a panic."288 But this is not advocacy. Shout-
ing fire under such circumstances is as much an act as firing a 
gun or lighting a fire. It is the same as if by a shout one inten-
tionally detonated an infernal machine. This is criminal con-
duct; not speech. 
A conspiracy to cause a violation of the law by means of ad-
vocacy was the problem which concerned the writer the most 
when he took charge of the so-called sedition case of World War 
II, known on the third indictment as United States v. McWu-
liams.289 At the outset the ·writer read Chafee's Free Speech in 
the United States,200 just as he had read Chafee's Freedom of 
Speech291 in his law school days; this was probably the book which 
stimulated him the most during his entire academic period. 
287 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 at 209-210 (1919). 
288 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 at 52 (1919). 
289 Crim. No. 73,086, D.D.C., Jan. 4, 1944. When the writer took over this prosecution 
in February 1943 there had already been tlvo indictments. United States v. Winrod, Crim. 
Nos. 70,153 and 71,203, D.D.C., July 21, 1942 and Jan. 4, 1943. 
290 Published in 1941. 
201 Published in 1920. 
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In order to make sure that Americans had their full measure 
of freedom of speech, the writer passed by the advocacy provisions 
of the Smith Act-he had criticized them at a meeting of the 
states' attorneys general at the Department of Justice in 1940, 
the year the Smith Act was adopted, as appearing to him to be 
in violation of the First Amendment.292 Instead he selected those 
provisions which made it a crime to conspire to cause insubordina-
tion among members of our armed forces and to distribute writ-
ten or printed matter counseling such insubordination-some 
of the literature of the defendants had turned up at army posts. 
But he still had his misgivings, and accordingly narrowed the 
application of even those provisions by seeking an indictment 
only against those individuals who additionally had some form of 
Nazi connections such as the Nazi party, the Nazi propaganda 
ministry, the Nazi foreign office, various Nazi organizations in 
touch with deviant groups in other countries, the German Library 
of Information, the German embassy in Washington, D.C., var-
ious German consulates in this country, the German-American 
Bund, and yet others. The third indictment thus alleged that 
the defendants conspired "with each other and with officials of 
the Government of the German Reich and leaders and members 
of the said Nazi Party." 
During the midst of the trial the Supreme Court decided 
Hartzel v. United States,293 reversing a conviction against an in-
dividual whose literature was similar to that of the defendants 
in the sedition case. The ground of the decision was the insuf-
ficiency of the evidence to show intent. The defendants in the 
sedition case promptly made the decision the basis of a new 
motion to dismiss. But Justice Murphy in the Court's opinion in 
the Hartzel case had this sentence, referring to the defendarl.t: 
"There was no evidence of his having been associated in any way 
with any foreign or subversive organization."294 The writer used 
it as the basis for an argument that he had anticipated the Court's 
decision, and that the Hartzel case was accordingly distinguish-
able. The trial judge, Edward C. Eicher, agreed. 
However, several months later Judge Eicher died, and the 
sedition case ended in a mistrial. The following year the Supreme 
292 For this, one of the attorneys general suggested that the writer must be a com-
munist or its equivalent. 
293 322 U.S. 680 (1944). 
294 Id. at 683. 
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Court in Keegan v. United States295 reversed the conviction of 
members of the German-American Bund on a charge of con-
spiracy to counsel evasion of military service. At the end of 
February 1946 the writer made use of. both the Hartzel and 
Keegan cases to recommend that the Department of Justice should 
nol-pros all three sedition indictments. The department did not 
accept his recommendation. A few weeks later the writer went 
to Germany at the request of Attorney General, now Justice, 
Tom C. Clark, to look for additional evidence. He found some, 
but in September 1946 he nevertheless repeated his recommenda-
tion that the three sedition prosecutions be nol-prossed. Again 
the department failed to follow his recommendation. However, 
various of the defendants made motions to dismiss and these were 
granted. 296 As a result of his experiences in the sedition case and 
his reflections on the First Amendment since then, the writer 
tends to the conclusion that even a conspiracy to cause a viola-
tion of the law, if the means to be employed consist of advocacy, 
should go unpunished. Legislatively the proscription of such a 
conspiracy is both unwise and ineffective; and constitutionally, 
at least so far as the Congress is concerned, it violates the First 
Amendment. From a federal standpoint, only those conspiracies 
should be punished where the defendants intend to effectuate 
them either with acts or with acts as well as advocacy. 
As this analysis premonishes on hindsight, Justice Holmes' 
clear and present danger test was to bring unwelcome results to 
him and Justice Brandeis. It soon did. Before the year in which 
it was enunciated was out, came Abrams v. United States,291 
where Justice Holmes in the course of his eloquent dissenting 
opinion, in which Justice Brandeis concurred, stated: "In this 
case sentences of twenty years imprisonment have been imposed 
for the publishing of two leaflets that I believe the defendants 
had as much right to publish as the government has to publish 
the Constitution of the United States now vainly invoked by 
them."298 The two leaflets opposed sending American troops to 
Vladivostok and Murmansk in the summer of 1918. 
In the same opinion, however, Justice Holmes also wrote: 
"I never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of 
295 325 U.S. 478 (1945). 
296 (D.C. Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 695, affirming (D.C. D.C. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 812. 
297 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
298 Id. at 629. 
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law that alone were before this court in the cases of Schenck, 
Frohwerk and Debs ... , were rightly decided. I do not doubt 
for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify 
punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitu-
tionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to 
produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about 
forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States con-
stitutionally may seek to prevent. The power undoubtedly 
is greater in time of war than in time of peace because war 
opens dangers that do not exist at other times."299 
He further made plain that what he had done in his clear and 
present danger test had been to apply to the field of advocacy the 
approach of the law of attempts. He additionally said in the 
Abrams case: " ... Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious 
publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, 
would present any immediate danger that its opinions would 
hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreci-
able tendency to do so. Publishing those opinions for the very 
purpose of obstructing however, might indicate a greater danger 
and at any rate would have the quality of an attempt .... "300 
But the results in the Abrams and other advocacy cases in 
which he and Justice Brandeis dissented301 stemmed from the ap-
plication of the approach in the law of attempt and of conspiracy 
to the field of speech. Once it is conceded that advocacy, without 
more, is not always protected by the First Amendment, then in 
times of stress neither the restrictive scope of a statute nor the 
clear and present danger test will be of great value in limiting 
suppression of speech. Concerning the prosecutions arising during 
World War I Professor Chafee in discussing Masses Publishing 
Co. v. Patten302 had to conclude: 
"As a result of this and similar decisions, the district 
judges ignored entirely the first element of criminal attempt 
and solicitation, that the effort, though unsuccessful, must 
approach dangerously near success .... A few judges, notably 
Amidon of North Dakota, swam against the tide, but of most 
Espionage Act decisions what Jefferson and Stephen and 
Schofield said about the prosecutions under George III and 
299 Id. at 627-628. 
300 Id. at 628. 
301 At the same term as the Abrams case they dissented in two cases in which the 
Court sustained convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917. Schaefer v. United States, 
251 U.S. 468 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920). 
so2 (2d Cir. 1917) 246 F. 24, reversing (S.D. N.Y. 1917) 244 F. 535. 
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the Sedition Act of 1798 can be said once more, that men 
were punished without overt acts, with only a presumed in-
tention to cause overt acts, merely for the utterance of words 
which judge and jury thought to have a tendency to injure 
the state. Judge Rogers was right in saying that the words 
of the Espionage Act of 1917 bear slight resemblance to the 
Sedition Law of 1798, but the judicial construction is much 
the same, except that under the Sedition Law truth was a 
defense."303 
On truth as a defense in the prosecutions under this country's 
first sedition act James M. Smith, in Freedom's Fetters, wrote: 
"The interpretation which the courts put on the truth 
provision made it worse than useless as an aid to the de-
fendant. Under the rulings handed down by the judges of 
the Supreme Court on circuit, this supposed safeguard ac-
tually reversed the normal criminal law presumption of inno-
cence. Instead of the government's having to prove that the 
words of the accused were false, scandalous, and malicious, 
the defendant had to prove that they were true. As Judge 
Samuel Chase put it, the accused had to prove all of his 
statements 'to the marrow. If he asserts three things and 
proves but two,' the jurist said, 'he fails in his defense, for 
he must prove the whole of his assertions to be true.' This 
is a clear illustration of the doctrine of presumptive guilt; 
in practice, the courts presumed the defendant guilty until 
he proved himself innocent. 
"Moreover, the accused was required not only to prove 
the truth of every word in every statement but, in one in-
stance, to prove an entire count in an indictment by the 
same witness. Even though the statement contained more 
than one point, the defendant could not introduce different 
witnesses to prove different points. According to Judge 
Chase, this practice would have been 'irregular and subver-
sive of every principle of law.' 
"The court also refused to distinguish between a false 
statement of facts and erroneous opinions. Indeed, the ex-
pression of any opinion on future events could be condemned 
as false under the interpretation given section three of the 
law. Although the prosecutor could no more prove the fal-
sity of a prediction than the defendant could prove its truth, 
803 FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 50-51 (1948). 
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the statement was considered false because the defendant 
had failed to carry the burden of proof. "304 
The exception to the First Amendment which Justice Holmes 
sanctioned in his clear and present danger test was to help pro-
duce still other unwanted results to him and especially to Justice 
Brandeis. At the term following the one at which the opinion in 
the Abrams case came down, the Court ruled in Milwaukee Pub. 
Co. v. Burleson305 not only that the provisions of the Espionage 
Act of 1917 declaring certain matter to be nonmailable were 
constitutional but also that the postmaster general had the power 
to deny the use of second class mail to a newspaper publisher who 
in the opinion of the postmaster general had violated the act's· 
provisions. Both justices dissented. 
In addition, the Court sustained convictions under state 
statutes restricting utterances: under a Minnesota sedition act 
in Gilbert v. Minnesota;806 New York's criminal anarchy act in 
Gitlow v. New York;807 and California's criminal syndicalism act 
in Whitney v. California.808 Justice Brandeis dissented in the 
Gilbert case and both he and Justice Holmes in the Gitlow case. 
However, in the latter case Justice Holmes concluded his dis-
senting opinion, in which Justice Brandeis joined, with this para-
graph: 
"If the publication of this document had been laid as an 
attempt to induce an uprising against government at once 
and not at some indefinite time in the future it would have 
presented a different question. The object would have been 
one with which the law might deal, subject to the doubt 
whether there was any danger that the publication could 
produce any result, or in other words, whether it was not 
futile and too remote from possible consequences. But the 
indictment alleges the publication and nothing more."309 
Concerning this dissent Justice Holmes wrote Pollock: "My 
last performance during the term, on the last day, was a dissent 
804 SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS 421-422 (1956). 
305 255 U.S. 407 (1921). In Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, (2d Cir. 1917) 246 F. 24, revers-
ing (S.D.N.Y. 1917) 244 F. 535, the court sustained the postmaster of the city of New 
York in seeking to bar from the mails a particular issue of a monthly magazine called 
The Masses. 
306 254 U.S. 325 (1920). 
307 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
308274 U.S. 357 (1927). See also Bums v. United States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927). 
309 268 U.S. 652 at 673 (1925). 
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(in which Brandeis joined) in favor of the rights of an anarchist 
(so-called) to talk drool in favor of the proletarian dictatorship."810 
The approach in these various cases provided the basis for 
the Court's decision in Dennis v. United States,311 in which it 
sustained the validity of the advocacy provisions of this country's 
third sedition law, the Smith Act. In the course of his opinion 
Chief Justice Vinson, relying on the phrasing of Chief Judge 
Learned Hand in the court's opinion below,312 modified the clear 
and present danger test into its converse: "Chief Judge Learned 
Hand, writing for the majority below, interpreted the phrase as 
follows: 'In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 
"evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of 
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' ... We adopt this 
statement of the rule.''313 
Dennis Case Dilemma 
Besides resulting in a certain measure of suppression of speech 
which it is submitted the First Amendment protects, the clear 
and present danger test as applied in the Dennis case involves the 
Court in this dilemma: either the Court has increased its legis-
lative functions; or it has transferred to the courts the determin-
ation of a question of fact which should have been left with the 
jury. It was the first horn of this dilemma which led Justice 
Jackson in his concurring opinion in the Dennis case to refuse 
to apply the clear and present danger test in reaching his con-
clusion as to the validity of the advocacy provisions of the Smith 
Act. 
Let us take these provisions. The Court sustained them be-
cause of the threats with which international communism con-
fronts us. As Chief Justice Vinson explained in his opinion in 
the Dennis case, "The situation with which Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis were concerned in Gitlow was a comparatively isolated 
event, bearing little relation in their minds to any substantial 
threat to the safety of the community .... They were not con-
810 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETI'ERs, Howe ed., 163 (1941). Actually Gitlow was a com-
munist. 
811341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
812 United States v. Dennis, (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 201 at 212. 
818 341 U.S. 494 at 510 (1951). In the Roth case Circuit Judge Frank in his concurring 
opinion suggested that in the light "of the Supreme Court's opinion in the Dennis case" 
he "would stress the element of probability in speaking of a 'clear danger.'" 237 F. (2d) 
796 at 826. 
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fronted with any situation comparable to the instant one-the 
development of an apparatus designed and dedicated to the over-
throw of the Government, in the context of world crisis after 
crisis."314 But suppose the communist danger lessens. Suppose 
communism changes industrially into various separate and fairly 
autonomous corporate entities and agriculturally into a sub-
stantial number of mechanized as well as privately held farms. 
What happens if the government now obtains a conviction on a 
conspiracy indictment under the advocacy provisions of the Smith 
Act against the leaders of American communism? What happens 
to such a conviction once international communism no longer 
exists as a threatening force in the world? 
After the Dennis decision the courts in Smith Act prosecutions 
fell into the practice of examining the international situation. 
They concluded that bad as it was when the prosecution began in 
the Dennis case, it had not lessened: if anything, it had become 
worse. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Flynn,315 the second Foley Square Smith Act conspiracy 
prosecution, stated: ". . . if the danger was clear and present 
in 1948, it can hardly be thought to have been less in 1951, when 
the Korean conflict was raging and our relations with the com-
munist world had moved from cold to hot war."316 The Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Mesarosh811 
and for the Sixth Circuit in Wellman v. United States318 quoted 
this language with approval.319 The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Lightfoot320 cited it similar-
ly.821 In the Lightfoot case the defendant pointed to the end of the 
Korean war. Also, in the words of the court, "defendant's counsel 
seemed to be deeply impressed by the Spirit of Geneva, and he 
professed to believe that the Geneva Conference had resulted in 
a complete relaxation of International tensions." The court 
responded: "The period covered by the indictment is, of course, 
the critical period for us to consider. However, in any case, wheth-
er a clear and present danger existed cannot depend on whether 
314 341 U.S. 494 at 510 (1951). 
315 (2d Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 354, cert. den. 348 U.S. 909 (1955). 
816 Id. at 367. 
317 (3d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 449, revd. on other grounds 352 U.S. 1 (1956). 
818 (6th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 757, judgment vacated and case remanded 354 U.S. 931 
(1957). 
819 223 F. (2d) 449 at 456; 227 F. (2d) 757 at 764. 
320 (7th Cir. 1956) 228 F. (2d) 861, revd. 355 U.S. 2 (1957). 
821228 F. (2d) 861 at 870 (1956). 
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the faces of the Communist Leaders in Russia are suffused with 
smiles. We need only make passing mention of the fact that at 
the time of the ·writing of this opinion, the smiles have been re-
placed with scowls, and the sugary words of such leaders have 
been supplanted by words of vituperative condemnation.''322 
Suppose, however, that international communism loses its 
momentum and power, and the Court so finds. Will the Court 
then hold that the advocacy provisions of the Smith Act cannot 
constitutionally be applied on the ground that there is no longer 
a clear and present danger that advocacy of the overthrow of 
the government by force and violence will bring about this result? 
But surely that will be legislating just as much as if Congress were 
to pass an act repealing the advocacy provisions of the Smith Act. 
It was this difficulty which Justice Jackson had in mind when he 
wrote in his concurring opinion: 
"If we must decide that this Act and its application are 
constitutional only if we are convinced that petitioner's 
· conduct creates a 'clear and present danger' of violent over-
throw, we must appraise imponderables, including inter-
national and national phenomena which baffle the best in-
formed foreign offices and our most experienced politicians. 
We would have to foresee and predict the effectiveness of 
Communist propaganda, opportunities for infiltration, 
whether, and when, a time will come that they consider 
propitious for action, and whether and how fast our existing 
government will deteriorate. And we would have to speculate 
as to whether an approaching Communist coup would not 
be anticipated by a nationalistic fascist movement. No doc-
trine can be sound whose application requires us to make a 
prophecy of that sort in the guise of a legal decision. The 
judicial process simply is not adequate to a trial of such far-
flung issues. The answers given would reflect our own politi-
cal predilections and nothing more. 
"The authors of the clear and present danger test never 
applied it to a case like this, nor would I. ... "323 
The other horn of the dilemma in the clear and present 
danger test as applied in the Dennis case is the removal from 
the jury of the determination of an issue of fact which that body 
properly should decide. In the ordinary case the jury determines 
whether there has been a criminal attempt or conspiracy. At first 
322Ibid. 
323 341 U.S. 494 at 570 (1951). 
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when the approach of the law of attempt and conspiracy was ap-
plied to the field of speech, this seemed to be the law there too. 
Justice Brandeis in his concurring and dissenting opinion in 
Schaefer v. United States,824 in which Justice Holmes joined, 
after explaining that the newly announced clear and present 
danger test was a rule of reason which involved a question of 
degree, continued: ". . . And because it is a question of degree 
the field in which the jury may exercise its judgment is, neces-
sarily, a wide one. But its field is not unlimited. The -trial pro-
vided for is one by judge and jury; and the judge may not ab-
dicate his function. If the words were of such a nature and were 
used under such circumstances that men, judging in calmness, 
could not reasonably say that they created a clear and present 
danger that they would bring about the evil which Congress 
sought and had a right to prevent, then it is the duty of the trial 
judge to withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury; 
and if he fails to do so, it is the duty of the appellate court to cor-
rect the error. . . . "825 
And such seemed to be the ruling of the Court in Pierce v. 
United States.826 In sustaining the overruling of a demurrer to 
the indictment Justice Pitney in the Court's opinion safd: 
" ... Whether the statements contained in the pamphlet had a 
natural tendency to produce the forbidden consequences, as 
alleged, was a question to be determined not upon demurrer but 
by the jury at the trial. There was no error in overruling the 
demurrer. ''827 
The defendants took the stand and testified that their sole 
purpose in distributing the pamphlet in question was to gain 
converts for socialism. Justice Pitney for the Court responded: 
"What interpretation ought to be placed upon the pamphlet, 
what would be the probable effect of distributing it in the mode 
adopted, and what were defendants' motives in doing this, were 
questions for the jury, not the court, to decide."828 
But District Judge Medina in the Dennis case instructed the 
824. 251 U.S. 466 (1920). 
825 Id. at 483. 
826 252 U.S. 239 (1920). 
827 Id. at 244. 
828 Id. at 250. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 
274 U.S. 357 (1927), in which Justice Holmes joined, wrote (at 379): "Whether, in 1919, 
when Miss Whitney did the things complained of, there was in Califorina such clear 
and present danger of serious evil, might have been made the important issue in the case. 
She might have required that the issue be determined either by the court or the jury. 
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jury that the application of the clear and present danger test 
presented a question of law for the determination of the court: 
"This is a matter of law about which you have no concern. It 
is a finding on a matter of law which I deem essential to support 
my ruling that the case should be submitted to you to pass upon 
the guilt or innocence of the defendants .... "329 And the Supreme 
Court affirmed a judgment of conviction under this instruction. 
Chief Justice Vinson wrote: 
"The question in this case is whether the statute which 
the legislature has enacted may be constitutionally applied. 
In other words, the Court must examine judicially the appli-
cation of the statute to the particular situation, to ascertain 
if the Constitution prohibits the conviction. We hold that 
the statute may be applied where there is a 'clear and present 
danger' of the substantive evil which the legislature had 
the right to prevent. Bearing, as it does, the marks of a 
'question of law,' the issue is properly one for the judge to 
decide."330 
Justice Douglas in his dissent observed: "I had assumed that 
the question of the clear and present danger, being so critical an 
issue in the case, would be a matter for submission to the jury. 
It was squarely held in Pierce v. United States ... to be a jury 
question .... "331 But the Court in the Dennis case ruled otherwise. 
Pre-emption 
Once it has been determined that federal power exists in a 
certain area another question arises, and that is whether the 
exercise of federal power supersedes the exercise of state power 
in that area. A half decade after the decision in the Dennis case 
the Court held in Pennsylvania v. Nelson332 that the federal Smith 
Act pre-empted the field, and that for this reason a Pennsylvania 
She claimed below that the statute as applied to her violated the Federal Constitution; 
but she did not claim that it was void because there was no clear and present danger 
of serious evil, nor did the request that the existence of these conditions of a valid 
measure thus restricting the rights of free speech and assembly be passed upon by the 
court or a jury .••• " 
329 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 512 (1951). 
330 Id. at 514-515. 
331 Id. at 587. 
332 350 U.S. 497 (1956), affirming 377 Pa. 58, 104 A. (2d) 133 (1954), reversing 172 
Pa. Super. 125, 92 A. (2d) 431 (1952). 
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sedition law was invalid. This decision also cast doubt on such laws 
of .other states-thirty-tliree jurisdictions, including Alaska and 
Hawaii, have sedition statutes.333 Indeed, after the Nelson holding 
the highest courts of two states, Kentucky and Massachusetts, 
invalidated state sedition indictments,334 and the Supreme Court 
of Michigan held unconstitutional various provisions of the 
Michigan Communist Control Law, commonly referred to as 
the Trucks Act.335 
At the same term as the Nelson decision the Court ruled in 
Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson836 that the union shop pro-
vision of the Railway Labor Act, which was written into the law 
in 1951,337 superseded the right to work provision of the Nebraska 
constitution. This ruling affected the laws in seventeen states.838 
In earlier cases in the labor field the Court determined that 
under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, enacted 
in 1935, and as amended by the Labor-Management Relations 
Act, 1947, Wisconsin's Public Utility Anti-Strike Act,339 the strike 
vote provision of a Michigan labor mediation law,340 an order 
of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board for the reinstate-
ment of an employee discharged because of his failure to join 
a union even though his employment was not covered by a 
union shop or similar contract, 341 a certification by the same board 
of a union as the collective bargaining representative,342 the pro-
visions of a New York statute under which the New York Labor 
Relations Board permitted the unionization of foremen, 343 and 
a Florida statute requiring a license for business agents of labor 
333 See Rogge, "Compelling the Testimony of Political Deviants," 55 MICH. L. REV. 
163 at 181 (1956). 
334 Braden v. Commonwealth, (Ky. 1956) 291 S.W. (2d) 843; Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 
(Mass. 1956) 134 N.E. (2d) 13. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hood, (Mass. 1956) 134 N.E. (2d) 
12. State courts in Massachusetts quashed state sedition indictments against a total of 
eight persons, including Prof. Dirk Struik, Massachusetts Institute of Technology mathe-
matician. N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1956, p. 6:1. 
335 Albertson v. Millard, 345 'Mich. 519, 77 N.W. (2d) 104 (1956). 
336 351 U.S. 225 (1956). For two cases on pre-emption at the 1957 term, see Youngdahl 
v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (peaceful picketing); Benanti v. United States, 355 
U.S. 96 (1957) (wiretapping by state officers). 
337 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. (1952) §152, Eleventh. 
338 See 351 U.S. 225 at 231-232 (1956). 
339 Amalgamated Assn. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951). 
340 United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950). 
341 Plankington Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 338 U.S. 953 
(1950). 
342 LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 
18 (1!)49). ' 
343 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947) •. 
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unions,344 were all invalid because of pre-emption. In the case 
involving the Michigan act the Court, after a review of the pro-
visions of the federal acts, ruled: "None of these sections can be 
read as permitting concurrent state regulation of peaceful strikes 
for higher wages. Congress occupied this field and closed it to 
state regulation."345 
In Alberts v. California,846 the California obscenity case at 
t4e 1956 term, counsel for petitioner, relying on federal obscenity 
legislation, 347 argued: "The scheme of federal regulation is so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left 
no room for the states to supplement it."348 The Court rejected 
the argument in that case,349 but federal power is now establis4ed. 
If Congress wishes to pre-empt the obscenity field it can do. so. 
Will Congress then add to the recently established Department 
of Health, Education, and W elfare850 yet another, a Department 
of Culture? 
"A General Consolidated Government"851 
With the Dennis, Nelson and Roth decisions we are indeed 
in danger of becoming the "general and consolidated govern-
ment"352 of which Jefferson in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, 
and the "general consolidated government" of' which the drafts-
man of the Kentucky Resolutions of l 799~ expressed their_ fears. 
It ·was this problem which Justice Harlan had in mind when: he 
wrote in his dissent in the Roth case: · · 
_"1\J + --1 ...... .:,ri +h.o. ,t ...... ..l ..... ,...~1 .;"l"'lf-D"l'"D[.lf- .;"t"'I ,....,,,... tt:> ,.; th N -t'" J.,.o ... v.1.1.1.y -~ LLJ.~ .1.-CU-C.La.L-.L.L.l.l..\.,.L\.,~~ .1..1 . .L J:'.a:01..\.,C1...a.ng- .1.e -.,_,a"'1on 
· against pornography attenuated, but the dangers of federal 
censorship in this field are far greater than anything ·the 
States may do. It has often been said that one of the great 
strengths of our federal system is that we have, in the forty-
344 fill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). 
345 United Auto Workers v. O'Brien, 839 U.S. 454 at 457 (1950). This language· was 
quoted with approval in Amalgamated Assn. v. Wisconsin Employment Relation~ Bd., 
340 U.S. 383 at 390 (1951). 
346 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
347 62 Stat. 768 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §1461; 69 Stat. 183 (1955), 18 
U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §§1461, 1465; 64 Stat. 451 (1950), 39 U.S.C. (1952) §259a; 70 Stat. 
699 (1956), 39 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §259b. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 109, 115. · ' 
348 Brief for Appellant, p. 115 (subheading). 
349 354 U.S. 476 at 493-494 (1957). 
350 67 Stat. 18 (1953), 5 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §623. 
351 4 ELuoT, DEBATE'S, 2d ed., 545 (1881). 
352 Id. at 542. 
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eight States, forty-eight experimental social laboratories. 
'State statutory law reflects predominantly this capacity of 
a legislature to introduce novel techniques of social control. 
The federal system has the immense advantage of providing 
forty-eight separate centers for such experimentation.' Dif-
ferent States will have different attitudes toward the same 
work of literature. The same book _which is freely read 
in one State might be classed as obscene in another. And it 
seems to me that no overwhelming danger to our freedom to 
experiment and to gratify our tastes in literature is likely to 
result from the suppression of a borderline book in one 
of the States, so long as there is no uniform nation-wide 
suppression of the book, and so long as other States are free 
to experiment with the same or bolder books. 
"Quite a different situation is presented, however, where 
the Federal Government imposes the ban. The danger is 
perhaps not great if the people of one State, through their 
legislature, decide that 'Lady Chatterley's Lover' goes so 
far beyond the acceptable standards of candor that it will be 
deemed offensive and non-sellable, for the State next door 
is still free to make its own choice. At least we do not have 
one uniform standard. But the dangers to free thought and 
expression are truly great if the Federal Government im-
poses a blanket ban over the Nation on such a book. The 
prerogative of the States to differ on their ideas of morality 
will be destroyed, the ability of States to experiment will be 
stunted. The fact that the people of one State cannot read 
some of the works of D. H. Lawrence seems to me, if not 
wise or desirable, at least acceptable. But that no person in 
the United States should be allowed to do so seems to me 
to be intolerable, and violative of both of the letter and spirit 
of the First Amendment. 
"I judge this case, then, in view of what I think is the 
attenuated federal interest in this field, in view of the very 
real danger of a deadening uniformity which can result from 
nation-wide federal censorship, and in view of the fact that 
the constitutionality of this conviction must be weighed 
against the First and not the Fourteenth Amendment ... .''3~3 
It has been to this problem that President Eisenhower has 
repeatedly given his attention during his two terms as our chief 
executive. In a message to Congress in March 1953 he recom-
mended "the creation of a commission to study the means of 
353 354 U.S. 476 at 505-506 (1957). 
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achieving a sounder relationship between Federal, State and local 
governments."354 Congress accordingly established a Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations355 "to study the proper role of 
the Federal Government in relation to the States and their 
political subdivisions . . . to the end that these relations may be 
clearly defined and the functions concerned may be allocated 
to their proper jurisdiction."356 The next month he told the 
45th annual Conference of Governors, meeting in Seattle, that 
he had "asked for a commission that would study this proper 
division between state responsibility and Federal responsibil-
ity."357 
The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, with 
Meyer Kestnbaum as its chairman, submitted reports totalling 
over 2000 pages. The index alone ran to almost 150 pages. In 
A Report to the President for Transmittal to the Congress it 
mustered the admonition: 
". . . Assuming efficient and responsible government at all 
levels-National, State, and local-we should seek to divide 
our civic responsibilities so that we: 
"Leave to private initiative all the functions that citizens 
can perform privately; use the level of government closest 
to the community for all public functions it can handle; 
utilize cooperative intergovernmental arrangements where 
appropriate to attain economical performance and popular 
approval; reserve National action for residual participation 
where State and local governments are not fully adequate, 
and for the continuing responsibilities that only the National 
Government can undertake."858 
President Eisenhower made the problem the subject of his 
address at Williamsburg, Virginia at a state dinner of the 49th 
annual Conference of State Governors. He cautioned that those 
who "would stay free must stand eternal watch against excessive 
concentration of power in government. "859 He pointed to the 
concentration of power in the hands of the communists in Russia, 
and observed, with reference to recent efforts there at decentral-
ization, that even "Soviet rulers have felt compelled to allow 
354 99 CONG. REc. 2459 (1953). 
355 Act of July 10, 1953, c. 185, 67 Stat. 145. 
356 Id., §1. 
357 For the text of his address see N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1953, p. 10:3-8. 
358 At p. 6 (1955). 
859 For the text of hls address see N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1957, p. 16:2-8. 
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sortie small. part of the Government to gravitate clos~r to the 
people/' He referred by way· ·of contrast to our · governmental 
system of checks and balances, but continued: "Yet a distin-
guished American scholar has only recently counseled us that in 
the measurable future, if. present trends. continue, the states are 
sure to degenerate into powerless satellites of the National Gov-
. ernment in Washington." 
· He stated· the· substance of the Tenth Amendment. With 
reference to a governor who wired Washington for help instead 
of asking the state legislature to act,. he commented: "But does 
it not tend to encourage the still greater growth of the distant 
and impersonal centralized bureaucracy that Jefferson held in 
such dread and warned ris about in such great and intense detail?" 
. He proposed the formation of a joint federal-state committee 
charged with these .duties: 
"One-To designate functions which the states are ready 
and willing to assume and. finance that are now perfqrmed 
or financed wholly or in part by the Federal Government; 
"Two-To recommend the Federal and State revenue 
adjustments required to enable the states to assume such 
functions, and 
_ "Three-To identify functions and responsibilities likely 
to requir~ state or Federal attention in the future and to 
_recommend the level of state effort, or Federal effort, or both, 
that will be needed to assure effective action." 
Such a study group has since been created. It is known as the 
Joint Federal-State Action Committee, and consists of seven fed-
eral officials, including three Cabinet officers, and ten state gov-
.. ernors. 860 
The concentration of power in the hands of the federal gov-
ernment was also a topic for discussion at the 1956 and 1957 
annual meetings of the American Bar Association and of the 
Conference of Chief Justices. In August 1956 at the 79th annual 
meeting of the American Bar Association the dominant note in 
the welcoming speech of Governor Allan Shivers of Texas and in 
the address of the association's then president, E. Smythe Gam-
brell, was that federal concentration of power threatened to 
destroy states' rights. Governor Shivers welcomed the members 
860N.Y. T1MES,July 21, 1957, p. 1:2, p. 40:3-5. 
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of the association "to a state whose people believe in the Tenth 
Amendment." Mr. Gambrell declared that in the "clamor of 
controversy" over the first eight amendments to the Constitution 
"our people seem to have overlooked the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments."361 In the same month the speakers at the Con-
ference of Chief Justices, composed of the highest judicial officers 
of the forty-eight states, took up the same theme.862 The latter 
body at its 1957 meeting authorized a special committee to study 
the role of the judiciary as it affected the distribution of power 
between the federal and state governments.863 
In addition to the President, the Conference of State Gov-
ernors, the Conference of Chief Justices, and the American Bar 
Association, a Government Operations subcommittee of the House 
of Representatives in July 1957 gave attention to the continuing 
growth of federal power. It held a hearing. One of its witnesses 
was Meyer Kestnbaum. He said that the study to be conducted 
by the Joint Federal-State Action Committee as well as a series 
of regional meetings which the subcommittee planned to hold 
after Congress adjourned could do a great deal to focus attention 
on the problem.864 
In September 1957 the National Conference of Chief Jus-
tices set up two special committees to study means of slowing the 
"constant expansion" of federal governmental power. One of 
these was to study the judiciary's role in the growth of federal 
power at the expense of the states.865 
So far little has been accomplished. Nevertheless, on one issue 
the states prevailed: the ownership of tidelands oil. However, they 
did not win their victory before the Supreme Court,366 but in 
Congress.367 This but bears out the observation of the Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations in its Report to the President 
that the Court, although the guardian of civil liberties,868 in com-
parison with, and contrast to, the other two branches of govern-
ment, over the past century and a half "except when dealing with 
861 N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1956, p. 1:4. 
362 N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 1956, p. 13:1. 
363 N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1957, p. 48:4-5. 
864 N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1957, p. 16:6. 
865 N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1957, p. 24:3-4. 
366 See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 33!) 
U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
367 Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29 (1953); 43 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §§1301 to 
1315; Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954). 
868 At pp. 29-30. 
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slavery, has probably taken the most consistently Nationalist 
position. "869 
State power can prevail in two other areas if the Court wi11 
but apply the First Amendment in the manner in which it is 
submitted its framers intended: obscenity and sedition. Obscenity 
is such a purely local matter that only local communities should 
decide what to do about it. As for sedition the only restrictions 
upon it should be those placed on state power by the "concept 
of ordered liberty"370 embodied in the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
869 Id. at 23. 
870 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 325 (1937). 
